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THE WEST VIRGINIA BAR ASSOCIATION
REMOVAL OF LIMITATION OF RECOVERABLE AMOUNT
IN ACTIONS FOR WRONGFUL DEATH AND EXTEND-
ING RIGHT OF ACTION GENERALLY FOR
INJURY TO PERSON OR PROPERTY *
JutLiN F. BOUcHELLE"
It would be superfluous to comment upon the history of Lord
Campbell's Act providing for recovery in actions for wrongful
death, well known to everypractitioner and included in the curric-
ulum of every law school. But much may be said concerning the
statutory limitation of the recoverable amount, $10,000.00, as now
contained in our statute, $5,000.00 at the time of its adoption in
1863. The time is long since past for its enlargement into one of
a humanely and properly conpensatory one, not only with respect
to the amount recoverable, but liberalization in other respects. The
legislative standardization of the value of a human life cannot be
justified in reason and justice. To give the jury and the courts
the latitude they have in fixing damages for personal injury and to
restrict them in cases of death have been found unjust and unfairly
compensable in thirty-three states whose statutes contain no
limitation of the recoverable amount. I suppose it is the spirit
of compromise inherent in many juries that often impels them to
return a verdict under the amount fixed by our statute, which some-
times results in inadequate verdicts. Such, in any event, has hap-
pened in my circuit in several instances. Incidentally it may be ob-
served that, should the present statute remain unchanged, a three-
fourths jury verdict would be a more salutary rule -instance the
case previously referred to in which there was a $2,500.00 verdict
with two jurors resisting any award, and ten in favor of a sub-
stantial one.'
It is interesting to note that Lord Campbell's Act, as en-
acted by the English Parliament, contained no limitation upon the
amount recoverable. Section 2 of the act is very broad in its terms,
providing that it shall be for the benefit of the wife, husband,
parent and child of the person whose death shall have been caused;
* Conclusion of an address delivered at the fifth annual meeting of the West
Virginia Judicial Association, at White Sulphur Springs, West Virginia, Octo-
ber 16, 1941. Part I appeared in (1942) 48 W. VA. L. Q. at p. 149.
: Judge of the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit of West Virginia and President
of the West Virginia Judicial Association.
1 (1942) 48 W. VA. L. Q. at p. 152.
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and that the jury may give such damages as they may think pro-
portioned to the injury resulting from such death to the parties
respectively, for whose benefit the action shall be brought.
It is stated that the difficulty of measuring damages sustained
by the wrongful death of a person and the possibility of extreme
awards by juries led to legislative adoption in the early statutes of
a stipulated limit of the amount recoverable. The courts, however,
have established satisfactory rules for measuring damages sus-
tained, upon which time does not permit me here to dwell.
Honorable B. J. Pettigrew, President of the Bar Association
of the City of Charleston, when a member of the judiciary com-
mittee of the house of delegates in the session of 1919, advised me
that he was active in the passage of a bill, introduced by Mr. Orville
Hackney, a fellow member, amending our statute removing the
limitation upon the recoverable amount, which passed the house
but was promptly lulled to peaceful slumber in the somnolent arms
of the judiciary committee of the senate, and could not be awakened
therefrom despite strenuous and persistent efforts. I am not ad-
vised of any other effort to so amend the act. Verifying this, Mr.
Pettigrew, who was a former assistant United States attorney and
is now assistant general counsel of the United Fuel Gas Company,
one of the largest utilities in the state, authorized me to say that
he was still of the same mind.
In one respect the statute has been broadened by our legislature
by the enactment of the amendment of 1931 to the Code,' which
provides for the survival of an action for an injury done to the
person of another upon the death of the wrongdoer, either by re-
vival of a pending suit, or the institution of an original suit,
whether or not the death of the wrongdoer occurred before or after
the death of the injured person. This was construed by the Supreme
Court of Appeals in the case of Byrd v. Byrd,' to extend only to
injuries which resulted in the death of the injured person as
surviving against the personal representatives of the wrongdoer-
far short of the extent to which the statute has been amended in
many jurisdictions.
In thirty-three states there is no limitation upon the recover-
able amount; seven by constitutional inhibition. Eleven states, in-
cluding our own, limit the amount to $10,000.00; one to $5,000.00;
one to $15,000.00 and one to $12,500.00. The Federal Employers'
Liability Act, actions under which may be maintained in state
2W. VA. REV. CoDE (1931) c. 55, art. 7, § 5.
3 7 S. E. (2d) 507 (W. Va 1940).
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courts concurrently with federal courts, contains no limitation upon
the amount of a verdict in case of death of the employee.4
4 WRONGFUL DEATH
AMOUNT AMOUNT
RECOVERABLE RECOVERABLE CONSTITUTION INHIBITS
STATE LIMITED BY NOT LIMITED LIMITATION OP AMOUNT
STATUE BY STATUTE RECOVERABLE
Alabama
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
rdaho
llinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts*
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico*
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina*
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
Vest Virginia
Wisconsin*
Wyoming
$5,000
$15,000
$10,000
$10,000
$10,000
$10,000
$10,000
$10,000
$10,000
$10,000
$10,000
$10,000
$10,000
$10,000
$12,500
X
X
X
X
X
Art. II, Sec. 31
Art. V, See. 32
See. 54
Art. I, See. 19a
Art. XXIII, Sec. 7
Art. III, Sec 21
Art. XVI, See. 5
TOTALS 15 1 33 7
* Indicates law somewhat peculiar to particular state.
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In some states the statutes allow the recovery not only of such
damages as the injured person might have recovered had he sur-
vived, but also for damages for his death. The courts of these states
construe such statutes as not independent of or unrelated to the
right of action which was in the deceased at his death, but which
relates to the consequences of the wrong inflicted on the decedent;
that is, that there are not two independent rights of action, but only
one liability, and such for the consequences for the wrongful act,
including the death. I perceive no sound objection to statutory
enlargements of this nature.
Our mother state, which surely is considered conservative in
matters of this kind, has adopted progressive amendments to her
original wrongful death statute, however, still retaining the maxi-
mum recoverable amount of $10,000.00. Section 5786 of the Vir-
ginia Code, as amended in 1926, contains an amendment identical
to ours of 1931, and I am informed that the latter amendment was
taken from the former. Section 5790, being a general revision by
the Acts of 1928, provides that an action under Section 5786 shall
not abate by the death of a defendant; and that where an action is
brought by a person injured by the wrongful act of another and
the injured person dies pending the action, it may be revived;
with the proviso that if death resulted from the injuries, the
declaration shall be amended to conform to an action under Section
5786, thus, perhaps, because of the limit of $10,000.00, providing
for survival against the estate of the wrongdoer only in the event
the injuries result in the death of the injured person. Tho remain-
ing provisions of Section 5790 of the Virginia Code provide for the
survival of an action for an injury done to the person of another,
not resulting in death, upon the death of the wrongdoer. And such
suit may be revived against the estate of the wrongdoer, or an origi-
nal suit brought against his personal representative, whether or
not the death of the wrongdoer occurred before or after the death
of the injured party.
I favor a general revision of our wrongful death statute, re-
moving all limitation upon the recoverable amount, and providing
generally for actions for personal injury, as well as for wrongful
death, both in favor of the injured person and his estate, whether
the injuries result in death or not, and against the tort-feasor or
his estate. So that it may be understood by the layman-recognize
right of action for injury to person or property by the dead against
the living, the dead against the dead, and the living against the
4
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dead. The questions of the nature of damages, whether punitive,
exemplary or compensatory, and the measure of damages, whether
determined by the existence of beneficiaries, next of kin, surviving
spouse and dependents generally, earning capacity and life-
expectancy of the deceased, are all incidental matters which can
readily be provided for in a carefully prepared act. Legislative
action only will be required to carry into effect such suggested
amendments.
While having no quarrel particularly with the majority
opinion in the case of Wilder v. Charleston Transit Co.,5 which
came to me from the Court of Common Pleas of Kanawha County,
and was by me certified to the Supreme Court of Appeals, upon a
plea that the decedent left no next of kin or beneficiaries capable
of taking under the statute provided for in the distribution of the
personal estate of an intestate, I am impressed with the liberality
of the language of the minority opinion saying that in part, "The
statute for the recovery of damages for death by a wrongful act
is a remedial one and should be liberally construed," and "It seem-,
almost repellent to basic conceptions of right and justice that in
any supposed case a defendant, guilty through gross negligence
of causing the death of another, might come into court and, though
admitting his negligence, avoid liability," because of the non-
existence of a surviving spouse or blood relative, or for any reason.
With me, as with the two minority judges, "The thought prevails"
that the tort-feasor "should face the issue on the merits," and "if
adjudged guilty, let him pay. Beyond that he should have no con-
cern." Y
REPEAL OF SECTION 35 OF ARTICLE VI OF THE
WEST VIRGINIA CONSTITUTION AND ADOPTION
OF AMENDMENT PERMITTING SUITS AND
ACTIONS AGAINST THE STATE
In another important respect the march of progress has over-
shadowed a constitutional provision materially and vitally affecting
the rights of the citizens of the state. I refer to Section 35, Article
6 of the Constitution providing that the state shall never be made
a defendant in any court of law or equity, amended in 1936, sub-
jecting the state and its officers to garnishee process. Only three
other states contain similar constitutional inhibitions, Alabama,
Arkansas and Illinois.
; 120 W. Va. 319, 197 S. E. 814 (1938).
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The Constitution of 1863, largely an adoption of the Virginia
Constitution, contained no such provision, as did not the State of
Virginia and which does not now have such. A careful perusal of
the journal of the Constitutional Convention of 1872 does not dis-
close any mention of the provision, except its inclusion in the report
of the committee on the whole on "legislative department," and
no discussion of it is found anywhere in the journal. As adopted
it was identical in terms with the Illinois Constitution. It may be
well assumed, however, that the reason motivating its adoption was
the contemplated possible involvement and harrassment of the state
by reason of inherited debts and obligations.
The background, of course, of such provision is the ancient
dogma, "The King can do no wrong," which was engrafted in our
theories of government, federal and state, along with the great body
of the common law, and by legislative enactment, more often
judicial determination, made prerequisite the consent of the state
to be made a party defendant. The cases of Stewart v. State Road
Comm.,6 and Watts v. State Road Comm.,7 'made absolute the state's
immunity from suit upon any cause of action, legal or equitable,
overruling a prior decision which tended to relax its positive man-
date. At the time of the decision of these two cases, I was Assistant
Attorney General and on briefs in both of them for the state. Prior
to my experience in that office, I had no clear appreciation of the
injustice of the denial of this right to citizens of the state; but,
by numerous instances of irremedial wrong inflicted upon citizens,
which came under my observation, I was awakened to the need for
some measure providing a remedy. There is no sound reason why
the principle of respondeat superior should not apply to the state,
much to the same extent that it does to the individual. I advo-
cated then, if not outright repeal of the provision, the creation of
a court of claims; and, upon mature reflection, I am now of the
opinion that Article 6, Section 35 of the Constitution should be
repealed and an amendment enacted permitting suits against the
state, surrounded with proper safeguards.
I have eminent and respectable precedent for this opinion.
By joint resolution adopted March 9, 1929, the legislature directed
the governor to appoint a commission of eleven members "to study
the Constitution and the needs of the State and submit to the
next regular session such Amendments as the commission deems
0 117 W. Va. 352, 185 S. E. 567 (1936).
7117 W. Va. 398, 185 S. E. 570 (1936).
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necessary to remove existing barriers and restrictions to the further
and greater development of the State." A commission of dis-
tinguished and able men duly made its report, upon which, how-
ever, no action was taken by the succeeding legislature. The fol-
lowing comment accompanied a proposed change of Article 6, See-
tiony 35:
"At present a number of the agencies of the State Govern-
ment have the authority to, and do make contracts with private
individuals. There is no method by which such private in-
dividuals may have adjudicated their claims for breach of such
contracts. State agencies through their agents and employees
may commit torts upon private individuals and their property
without being required to answer in a court of law or equity
for damages sustained thereby. The commission is of opinion
that remedies should be provided under proper safeguards
whereby just claims arising either out of breach of contract
or tort may be adjudicated and satisfied."
And the amendment should not confine venue to the county
where the seat of government is located, but should make provision
for such as in suits between individuals. I must confess to a sense of
selfishness in this suggestion, for thereby would I be relieved of
much mental anguish which accompanies the numerous suits in-
volving state officers and agencies. There are four waiting gloating-
ly in Charleston to haunt my return.
The extension of governmental activities in fields of private
enterprises, the vast and increasing number of its agents and the
continuous urge for expansion of governmental function beyond
the original concept of democratic forms of government provide
reason for the abolition of such an outmoded and onesided law.
The absurdity and unsoundness of constitutional, statutory or
common law denial of the rights of the citizens in this regard are
well illustrated by two quotations. Again from Herbert's Un-
commnon Law, where he has one of his characters say:
"One of the first actions of a loyal young Englishman
who begins to study the law of the land is to read carefully
the pages which are concerned with the King; and he learns
with some surprise the ancient constitutional and legal princi-
ple that the King can do no wrong. He is surprised for this
reason; that the whole course of his historical studies at school
has led him to believe that at the material dates of English
history the King was always doing wrong. . . . It is not too
much to say that the whole constitution has been erected upon
the assumption that the King not only is capable of doing
7
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wrong but it more likely to do wrong than other men if he is
given the chance. To this hypothesis we owe the Great Charter,
the Petition of Right, the Bill of Rights, the Act of Settle-
ment, the Habeas Corpus Act, the doctrine of Ministerial
responsibility, the independence of the judiciary, the very
existence of the two Houses of Parliament, and indeed, all
the essential pillars in the noble fabric of the Constitution.
"It is odd, then, that this maxim should survive in a
political system which was invented to contradict it, and that
our forefathers, who were compelled to rebel against the prac-
tice, should have reverently retained the principle. For in
origin, I suspect, these words were not so much a testimony
to royal infallibility as a convenient excuse for royal mis-
feasance. King John, I believe, was the first monarch to an-
nounce to his people that the King could do no wrong....
"All these Departments, nominally controlled by one who
is nominally the King's Minister, enjoy in practice the bene-
fit of the doctrine that the King can do no wrong. So that
if a subject be injured through the negligent or dangerous
'driving of a Post Office van he has at law no remedy against
the Crown or Post Office; whereas in like case he could recover
damages from a private company which employed the driver.
For the Crown is incapable of negligence; neither can it be
charged with libel or fraud or any other tortious act; nor is
it responsible, like the rest of us, for the tortious acts of its
servants done within the general scope of their employment.
This cannot be justified except by loose! or arrogant think-
ing. .. . There is no good reason, except in time of war or
civil emergency, why a Government Department should not
be amenable to the ordinary law of tort in its relations with
the subject or its own servants; nor can I perceive why a con-
tract of service in the Army or Navy should not be as sacred
and as strictly enforceable as a contract of service in a
restaurant or drugstore. This is no trivial or academic mat-
ter; for the Crown or State is constantly enlarging the scope
of its activities and the number of its servants."
Professor Borchard, in an article written in 1924, made these
very sound observations:
"The common law and the political theory underlying
both British and American constitutional law have been re-
garded as a bulwark of protection to the individual in hi-
relations with the government.... Yet it requires but a slight
appreciation of the facts to realize that in Anglo-American
law the individual citizen is left to bear almost all the risks
of a defective, negligent, perverse or erroneous administration
of the State's functions, an unjust burden which is becoming
8
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graver and more frequent as the Government's activities be-
come more diversified and as we leave to administrative officers
in even greater degree the determination of the legal relations
of the individual citizen. . . . Yet there is no reason why the
most flagrant of the injuries wrongfully sustained by the citi-
zen, those arising from the torts of officers, should be allowed
to rest, as they now generally do, in practice if not in theory,
at the door of the unfortunate citizen alone. This hardship
becomes the more incongruous when it is realized that it is
greatest in countries like Great Britain and the United States,
where democracy is assumed to have placed the individual on
the highest plane of political freedom and individual justice.
"The reason for this long-continued and growing in-
justice in Anglo-American law rests, of course, upon a medieval
English theory that 'the King can do no wrong,' which without
sufficient understanding was introduced with the common law
into this country, and has survived mainly by reason of its
antiquity. The facts that the conditions which gave it birth
and that the theory of absolutism which kept it alive in Eng-
land never prevailed in this country and have since been dis-
carded by the most monarchical countries of Europe, have
nevertheless been unavailing to secure legislative reconsidera-
tion of the propriety and justification of the rule that the
State is not legally liable for the torts of its officers. "s
The constitutions of fourteen states make affirmative pro-
visions for suits against the state, which, however, are not self-
executing, but require enabling legislation. Quite generally, al-
though there are a few exceptions, there is a reluctance to permit
recovery upon tort claims. Such is so held in a recent case decided
by the Virginia Court of Appeals.9 In passing, it is interesting to
note the liberality of Virginia towards its citizens in this regard,
containing express statutory provisions for the assertion of claims
against the state in its courts, and the liberal construction of such
statutes by its courts.
One annotator has observed that the Commonwealth of Vir-
ginia will not be astute to escape inquiry into its liability or to take
advantage of technical defenses which are permissible to other
litigants. Bouldin, J., in Higginbotham's Ex'x v. Comonwvealth,0
thus expressed his views:
"... my opinion is, that under the statutes of the state,
she is liable to be sued in this case by petition against the
8 Borehard, Government Liability in Tort (1924) 34 YALE L. J. 1.
9 Wilson v. State Highway Comm'r, 174 Va. 82, 4 S. E. (2d) 746 (1939).
10 25 Gratt. 627, 637 (Va. 1874).
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auditor, and that judgment should have been rendered against
her. I do not mean to intimate that a state can be sued in any
case either by her own citizens or others, in her own courts,
without her authority and against her consent. But it has
ever been the cherished policy of Virginia to allow to her
citizens and others the largest liberty of suit against herself;
and there never has been a moment since October 1778 (but
two years and three months after she became an independent
state), that all persons have not enjoyed this right by express
statute."
The creation of the court of claims by the last legislature is
at least a forward gesture. Time does not permit an analysis or
discussion of this act, except to observe that it contains many
deficiencies, both in the act itself, and in the remedy intended to
be given. A careful examination of it will disclose inherent im-
perfections and weaknesses. It is only advisory and provides mere-
ly a recommended recovery, and under the present constitutional
inhibition, any legislature may ignore its findings.
The procedure is too loose and nonlegalistic. In the adjudication
of the state's liability in matters contractual or tort, it should be
given the benefit and protection accorded the individual litigant in
following recognized and established rules of evidence, the right,
of trial by jury, application of equitable principles and the learn-
ing and experience of the chancellor in equity procedure.
The most precious, the most cherished confirmation of human
rights is found in Article 3, Section 17 of the Constitution:
"The courts of this State shall be open, and every per-
son, for an injury done to him, in his person, property or
reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law; and jus-
tice shall be administered without sale, denial or delay."
This is the hub, the fixed immovable center around which all
other constitutional grants and guarantees revolve. In the pro-
cess of change and development of human rights and restraints,
evolutionary or revolutionary, they should be molded by its pattern
and ever held within control of its sphere.
ANNOUNCENvENTS
1942 ANNUAL METING
The fifty-sixth annual meeting of The West Virginia Bar
Association will be held at Wheeling, West Virginia, on Thursday
and Friday, October 8 and 9, 1942. The invitation was extended
10
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